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Educational heterogamy and father-to-son 
occupational mobility in 23 industrial nations: 
General societal openness or compensatory 
strategies of reproduction? 
WOUT C. ULTEE AND RUUD LUIJKX 
ABSTRACT This article presents 41 educational heterogamy tables for 23 industrial nations after World War 
II. Countries differ in gross heterogamy rates and relative chances of heterogamy. Evidence is found in favour 
of a trend towards higher gross rates of heterogamy and towards more equal relative chances of heterogamy. 
Hypotheses on effects of economic and political factors are tested. The contribution these factors make to the 
explanation of relative heterogamy is smaller than found in studies on intergenerational mobility. Between 
countries more equal relative father-to-son occupational mobility chances go together with more equal relative 
chances of educational heterogamy. Within countries relative mobility chances are more equal than relative 
chances of heterogamy. All in all Lipset and Zetterberg's notion of general societal openness is confirmed, 
whereas Bourdieu's notion tblt mobilit~ d heterogamy are compensatory strategi~ · of reproduction is not 
upheld. 
INTRODUCTION 
Comparative mobility research took off in the 
1950s when national monographs accumulated. 
After thorough reanalysis of old tables in the 
1960s and 1970s, the 1980s yielded several 
studies establishing differences between indus-
trial nations with respect to father-to-son 
occupational mobility by analyzing more 
recently collected tables (Heath, 1981; Grusky 
and Hauser, 1984; Erikson and Goldthorpe, 
1987; Ganzeboom, Luijkx and Treiman, 1989). 
In addition to mobility, earlier studies compared 
outmarriage (Hall, 1954; Lipset and Zetterberg, 
1959). By analyzing 41 educational heterogamy 
tables for 23 industrial nations, this article 
combines the subject of differences in out-
marriage between industrial countries with that 
of changes in outmarriage within these 
countries. The first section of this article notes 
that mobility and outmarriage have routinely 
been taken to indicate societal openness, 
reviews the drift of mobility questions, and 
proposes outmarriage questions on a par with 
recent ones about mobility. After presenting a 
framework holding that outmarriage and 
mobility tell about societal openness, the second 
section of this article details these outmarriage 
questions. The third section contrasts two sets of 
hypotheses answering them. One set was gen-
eralized from longstanding hypotheses in the 
field of comparative social mobility. A rival set 
applies Bourdieu's (1974, 1989) recent and as 
yet less well researched notion of compensatory 
interdependencies between different strategies 
of reproduction. Contradictory hypotheses per-
tain to, among other matters, the relation 
between educational heterogamy and father-to-
son occupational mobility. This article's later 
sections test these two sets of hypotheses. 
THE RISE OF MOBILITY ISSUES AND THE 
FALL OF HETEROGAMY QUESTIONS 
Rogoff (1953: 19) stated in her monograph on 
intergenerational mobility in Marion County, 
Indianapolis (United States), that 'occupational 
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mobility is studied as an index of the relative 
"openness" of a social structure.' Other 1950s 
studies assumed that father-to-son mobility is 
but one of several indicators for openness of 
societies. In a work on social mobility in Britain, 
Berent (1954: 321) stated: 'One of the tests for 
the "openness" of social structure is the extent 
of marriage between persons of different social 
origins.' A cross-classification of occupations of 
spouses' fathers was made and one of husbands' 
and wives' education. This study also contained 
a comparison of occupational outmarriage tables 
concluding that the degree of status association 
between brides and grooms was probably about 
the same in the United States and England & 
Wales (Hall, 1954: 346). In the beginning, one 
might say, questions about openness were 
twofold. 
The first comparison of several national 
father-to-son mobility tables gained definitive 
form in a 1959 chapter by Lipset and Zetterberg. 
On the basis of tables for nine nations it was held 
that 'the overall pattern of social mobility 
appears to be much the same in the industrial 
societies of the various Western countries' 
(Lipset and Zetterberg, 1959: 13). This result 
was buttressed by findings on outmarriage. 
Lipset and Zetterberg had guessed before locat-
ing data 'that comparative materials on inter-
class marriage patterns would reveal that there 
are fewer marriages across class lines in Europe 
than in America' (Lipset and Zetterberg, 1959: 
47). However, as they pointed out, this excep-
tion did not square with Hall's conclusion that 
marriage patterns in the United States and 
Britain were similar. In addition, assembled 
data on outmarriage in Bavaria (Germany), 
Philadelphia, Aarhus (Denmark), Aberdeen 
(Scotland), France, Sweden, and Denmark 
showed similar patterns too. In the end Lipset 
and Zetterberg regarded the similarity between 
Europe and America with respect to interclass 
marriage in some ways as even more interesting 
than the similarity of their intergenerational 
mobility. 
Blau and Duncan (1967: 354), the paradigm 
for a second wave of father-to-son mobility 
studies, answered several questions about out-
marriage in the United States. The trend in 
educational heterogamy, like that in father-to-
son mobility, was ascertained by classifying 
dyads after husband's, in casu son's, cohort 
(year of birth). The association between 
spouses' own education was shown to be higher 
than that between their fathers' occupations. No 
assertion was made to the effect that 
heterogamy indicates societal openness. 
The claim that frequencies in mobility and 
outmarriage tables indicate aspects of societal 
openness surfaced again in mobility studies from 
the past decade. In 1982 Hout compared a 
father-to-son mobility table for the United 
States with a table cross-classifying husbands' 
and wives' occupation in two-earner US 
families. He maintained: 'The basic questions 
underlying the study of intergenerational 
mobility concern the rigidity of the status hier-
archy and the importance of status-group 
boundaries in the overall process of occu-
pational achievement. The same questions can 
be addressed through the analysis of the associa-
tion between husbands' and wives' occupations.' 
Hout added that 'the unlikely event of there 
being no association between spouses' occu-
pational statuses would indicate an openness of 
the status hierarchy not evidenced by studies of 
the association between fathers' and sons' 
statuses' (Hout, 1982: 398). In 1984 Sixma and 
Ultee, as a check upon conclusions for the 
Netherlands about the trend in father-to-son 
mobility, compared educational heterogamy 
tables for this country from 1959, 1971, and 
1977. To test the hypothesis that the 
Scandinavian nations do not differ in outmar-
riage, Pontinen (1980, 1983) compared several 
types of outmarriage tables for these four 
countries. 
Outmarriage tables in the 1980s have been 
analyzed by log-linear models. At the end of the 
1970s these models were applied in studies 
answering the longstanding question of whether 
industrial societies display a trend towards more 
mobility with tables obtained from two surveys 
undertaken about a decade apart but using 
almost the same methodology (Featherman and 
Hauser, 1978). Comparison of tables ofthis type 
is an improvement upon comparison of tables 
obtained by classifying respondents from one 
survey after their year of birth. Although early 
studies applying global log-linear models found 
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no change whatsoever, at the end of the 1980s, 
after employing more powerful log-linear 
models, it had become clear that in several 
industrial nations at least in certain periods a 
trend towards more mobility occurred (Hope, 
1981a for Britain; Erikson, 1983 for Sweden; 
Ganzeboom and De Graaf,. 198~ and 
Ganzeboom et al, 1987 for the Netherlands; 
Hout, 1988 for the United States). Log-linear 
models also were applied to father-to-son 
mobility tables for 16 nations (Grusky and 
Hauser, 1984). One issue in that comparison was 
a new version of the old question of whether 
mobility patterns of industrial societies are simi-
lar, another one the question of whether 
political changes, after allowing for economic 
factors, make a country's mobility pattern more 
open. 
This review of literature on mobility cum 
outmarriage indicates that the study of father-to-
son mobility progressed from testing the 
descriptive hypothesis that mobility does not 
differ between countries by way of small-scale 
comparisons, towards testing rival explanations 
of differences between countries through large-
scale ones. In contrast, comparative out-
marriage studies stuck to the hypothesis of no 
differences, which was being tested for a dwin-
dling number of cases. Although the stock of 
published and on-file outmarriage tables by now 
should be sufficient for a large-scale under-
taking, as yet no such study has been attempted. 
The next section of this article details out-
marriage questions for this endeavour. It does so 
after elaborating a framework comprising 
mobility and outmarriage as aspects of societal 
openness. 
MOBILITY, OUTMARRIAGE AND 
SOCIETAL OPENNESS 
Although mobility studies routinely suppose 
that frequencies in father-to-son and out-
marriage tables indicate openness, this assump-
tion was not always backed up by cogent 
arguments. 1 According to this article, the 
framework for viewing father-to-son mobility 
and outmarriage as aspects of the openness of a 
society's social structure is as follows. One gen-
eral question driving the study of father-to-son 
mobility is that of societal cohesion. Lipset and 
Zetterberg, for instance, were not only inter-
ested in mobility as a phenomenon in its own 
right, but also as a preliminary to the larger 
question of why there is no socialism in the 
United States and the even more vast one of 
whether more mobility makes for less political 
strife. Societal cohesion is not only indicated by 
the absence of negative relations between a 
society's strata, but also by the existence of 
positive links between them, especially primary 
relations. One such tie is marriage between 
persons coming from different strata, another 
one having a son in a different stratum. The 
more frequent the positive links of a certain type 
between a society's strata, the more open these 
strata and the more cohesive this society may be 
called. According to this argument educational 
and occupational heterogamy are indicative of a 
society's openness since these phenomena 
amount to the existence of positive social rela-
tions between persons varying in some impor-
tant resource in the competition with other 
members of society for scarce rewards. 
Of course, more links between strata are 
possible than father-to-son and husband-wife 
relations, and they may differ in strength. In line 
with Bogardus' (1925a, 1925b) scale for subjec-
tive distance between nationalities, Wilkinson's 
(1929) adaptation of this scale for subjective 
distance between occupations, and Laumann 
and Guttman's (1966) analysis yielding objective 
distances between occupations, the frequency of 
neighbours and friends with certain occupations 
also indicate openness of strata. Of these rela-
tionships, marriage perhaps tells most about 
positive social relationships, and paternity least. 
After all, persons in industrial societies are more 
discerning about spouses than about friends and 
neighbours. 2 And although fathers and sons 
having a dissimilar education or occupation do 
differ with respect to a certain resource, it is not 
always possible to assume the existence of posi-
tive social relationships: communication by sons 
may be diminished upon climbing and communi-
cation by fathers when their sons descend. 
Although father-to-son mobility and 
heterogamy may be taken as indicative of 
societal openness in the relational framework 
outlined above, this interpretation is more prob-
'"\ 
) 
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lematic depending on whether individual or 
households are to be the basic units of mobility 
research. 3 Father-to-son mobility not only 
involves the establishment of a relation between 
social strata, but also the movement of men 
from one stratum to another. But if flows are 
taken to indicate openness, which unit changes 
place in case of outmarriage? Women are mov-
ing if the assumption is made that the family is 
the fundamental unit of stratification and that 
the occupation of the husband characterizes the 
wife (Parkin, 1971: 14). On this account, how-
ever, movement of women is from father's to 
husband's occupation, thus discarding Hout's 
question about the association between hus-
band's and wife's occupation as a question about 
societal openness. This is not a fully satisfactory 
position. If individuals are taken as the funda-
mental unit in stratification research (Acker, 
1973), no person is moving when outmarriage 
takes place, since individuals upon marrying 
remain individuals. This a~~umption <ty make 
possible analysis of the mobility of daughters, 
but it does so by doing away with the pertinence 
of any outmarriage data for questions on open-
ness. This is not satisfactory either. Objections 
to both positions point towards abandoning the 
substantialist framework by which they have 
been generated in favour of a relational one. 
Within this relational framework this article 
addresses questions on educational heterogamy. 
The reason why no tables cross-classifying 
occupations of fathers and fathers-in-law were 
analyzed, is not simply that they were not avail-
able in sufficient quantity. If Blau and Duncan's 
finding is kept in mind that the association 
between spouses' education is stronger than that 
between the occupations of their fathers, a case 
might be made in favour of characteristics of the 
spouses themselves. The argument for questions 
on educational heterogamy rather than occu-
pational outmarriage is that the former do and 
the latter do not refer to all couples, and that 
questions about all couples are to be preferred. 
In addition, if occupations form the backbone of 
an industrial society's reward system (Parkin, 
1971: 19), education is its spinal cord. 
The starting point for this article's questions 
on educational heterogamy is that although 
mobility and outmarriage are aspects of the 
openness of a society's social structure, these 
phenomena may or may not point towards vastly 
different aspects of that structure. If hypotheses 
accounting for father-to-son mobility in various 
countries do not also clarify their educational 
heterogamy, no comprehensive explanation of 
societal openness is possible. In contrast, if a 
ranking of countries in terms of father-to-son 
mobility corresponds with their grading in terms 
of educational heterogamy, something like the 
general openness of societies exists. Thus this 
article's first question is descriptive: are patterns 
of educational heterogamy, as patterns of 
mobility supposedly are, pretty much the same 
in industrial societies? The second one is about 
changes: since the hypothesis of a trend towards 
more mobility in industrial nations just will not 
lie down, is there evidence in favour of a trend 
towards more educational heterogamy? The 
third one is explanatory: do economic and 
political characteristics of industrial nations, 
purportecf!y influencing • '1 eir mobility, also 
influence their pattern of educational 
heterogamy? The fourth one is about the re-
lation between mobility and heterogamy: if an 
industrial nation displays more educational 
heterogamy, does it also show more father-to-
son mobility? 
By asking these questions, this article regards 
Heath (1981) and Grusky and Hauser (1984) as 
baseline studies. It adds to them, not by analyz-
ing new mobility tables, but by explaining a 
phenomenon that, like mobility, has been held 
to indicate a society's openness. This article does 
not therefore test predictions from current 
theories about marriage such as those of Blau 
(1977) and Becker (1981), theories which might 
also explain mobility. The question of whether 
the factors accounting for heterogamy in the 
literature on the family may also influence 
mobility is considered a separate one. 
ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES ANSWERING 
HETEROGAMY QUESTIONS 
One set of hypotheses to be tested in this article 
gives affirmative answers to each of this article's 
four questions. According to its first hypothesis 
at one point in time educational heterogamy is 
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pretty much the same in industrial nations. 
According to its second one, the ongoing pro-
cess of industrialization, apart from a trend 
towards more intergenerational mobility, oc-
casions a trend towards more educational 
heterogamy. Its third one explains these find-
ings: factors making for mobility in industrial 
societies also make for heterogamy. These 
factors are not only economic but also political 
and include a higher level of economic develop-
ment, social democracy, state socialism. 
According to the fourth hypothesis of this set, a 
ranking of countries after mobility parallels their 
ranking after heterogamy. According to these 
hypotheses, something like the general openness 
of societies exists, and educational heterogamy 
is part of it. 
This set of hypotheses has been expressed 
most fully by Lipset and Zetterberg (1959), and 
was employed more recently by Heath. After 
describing Britain's mobility in 1972 and chart-
ing the trend in mobility since the beginning of 
this century, to sketch long-term trends, Heath 
(1981: 103) switched to outmarriage data. In a 
review of equalities in Eastern Europe, Connor 
(1979: 269) considered the claim that marriage 
patterns are uniquely 'democratic' under state 
socialism, and thus distinct from those in the 
West. Sorokin ([1927], 1964: 185) already con-
tains the hypothesis that if few outmarriages 
occur in a society, father-to-son inheritance is 
usual. 
The hypothesis that ongoing industrialization 
makes for more educational heterogamy not 
only may be obtained by generalizing from 
mobility research. It has also been presented in 
the literature on changes in the institution of 
marriage. According to Kerckhoff (1972), 
development from an agrarian . to an industrial 
technology was accompanied by a shift from 
marriages arranged in the interests of families 
towards love marriages. Shorter (1975: 154, 156) 
held that one may speak of the advance of true 
love to the extent that homogamy decreases and 
people begin marrying those unlike themselves, 
and explicitly stated that the tendency to marry 
within one's general social bracket diminished 
over the long haul. 
Educational sociologists buttressed the 
hypothesis that social democracy makes for 
more heterogamy. They did so by holding that 
laws on comprehensive schooling favoured by 
social democrats not only weaken the relation 
between father's occupation and child's edu-
cation (thus making for more mobility), but also 
provide opportunities for social interaction 
across class barriers (Ford, 1968; 1969). If 
comprehensive schooling is introduced, selec-
tion and teaching of pupils according to ability is 
postponed until a later age. This creates more 
ties between persons finally attaining different 
levels of education, whereas they are forestalled 
by selection before the awaking of sexual aware-
ness. If friendships between teenagers lead to 
marriages in later life, social democracy makes 
for heterogamy. This argument implies the 
hypothesis that the earlier the age stipulated by 
the educational laws of a country for selecting 
pupils into different schools, the less educational 
heterogamy there will be in this country. 
Another set of answers to this article's four 
questions contradicts the 'classical argument' 
outlined above on all counts. It will be termed 
the 'rival argument'. According to it, no positive 
relation between mobility and heterogamy 
obtains. Indeed, there is a difference in kind 
between the occupation of a person's father and 
the education of a person's spouse. The first 
characteristic is 'ascriptive', while the second 
one is 'achieved'. Now a prediction that societies 
become more open, may be derived from the 
hypothesis that ongoing industrialization makes 
for a declining influence of ascriptive factors. 
This hypothesis does not predict a lower associa-
tion between achieved characteristics. If a per-
son's occupation depends less and less upon the 
occupation of this person's father and ever more 
strongly upon the school examinations this per-
sons has passed, males and females with similar 
qualifications increasingly team up to form a 
couple. If persons think they will make it 
because of their education, they will tend to 
marry others with comparable levels of edu-
cation. 
Examples of this argument in the sociology of 
the family are Goode (1982: 53) and Collins 
(1985: 120-121): homogqmy because of group 
pressures in pre-industrial societies gives way to 
homogamy resulting from free marriage market 
processes in industrial ones. Punch is added to 
) 
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this argument by applying Bourdieu's notion of 
compensatory interdepende~ies between strat-
egies of reproduction. Bqtoieu placed edu-
cational strategies and matrimonial strategies, 
among others, under the heading of strategies of 
reproduction, and argued that if one strategy of 
reproduction becomes less successful, invest-
ments in other strategies increase (Bourdieu, 
1972: 1123; 1974: 35; 1979: 177-178; 1989: 386-
392). A well-known exemplification of this 
notion is the hypothesis that rich parents to 
some extent offset the diminishing influence of 
their financial resources on the education of 
their children by heavier investments in cultural 
resources. De Graaf (1986) is a corroboration of 
this prediction for the Netherlands. This article 
suggests another instance -of Bourdieu's notion 
of compensatory interdependencies: if the inter-
generational transfer of resources decreases, 
members of the new generation with above 
average resources increasingly pool their 
resources. What happens to the parties in 
parent-child dyads upon a slackening of repro-
duction through one strategy, is that parents to 
some extent compensate their children and that 
children to a certain degree help themselves. 
Thus, if the transmission of higher occupations 
by fathers to their sons diminishes, educational 
homogamy thrives. 
The hypotheses making up the rival argument 
thus answer this article's first question with the 
not-so-definite hypothesis that countries may 
very well differ in educational heterogamy. 
According to the rival argument the answer to 
this article's second question is that a trend 
towards more father-to-son occupational 
mobility is accompanied by a trend towards less 
educational heterogamy. Also according to the 
rival argument, if economic development 
increases, heterogamy decreases. And if pupils 
are selected at a later age, this not only will lead 
to more mobility, but also to less educational 
heterogamy. This answers this article's third 
question. The rival answer to this article's fourth 
question is that the more father-to-son mobility 
in an industrial society, the less educational 
heterogamy it displays. 
The issue of whether outmarriage and father-
to-son mobility indicate vastly different or 
equivalent aspects of societal openness has now 
been turned into testable alternative hypoth-
eses. These hypotheses will be tested in the 
following sections of this article. 
DATA 
Tables on educational heterogamy were 
obtained for 23 industrial nations. For some 
countries more than one table is analyzed. For 
France, Hungary, the Netherlands and the 
United States three tables have been found. 
There are two tables for Austria, Australia, 
Canada, England & Wales, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Finland, Flemish 
Belgium, Japan, Norway, and Sweden. One 
table has been procured for Czechoslovakia, 
Denmark, the Irish Republic, Italy, Northern 
Ireland, New Zealand, Poland, Scotland, and 
Yugoslavia. This makes for 41 tables in all. 
Missing industrial nations are the German 
Democratic Republic, the Soviet Union, Spain, 
and Switzerland. 
The aim for this article was to collect at least 
one table dated 1970 or later, and at least one 
for some year before 1970 but after World War 
II. As mentioned, for nine countries only one 
table-always referring to 1970 or later-was 
found. For Austria, Canada, Federal Republic 
of Germany, Finland, Flemish Belgium, and 
Sweden both are dated after 1970, for Japan 
both tables are from before that year. As far as 
coverage of age groups goes, there are two less 
satisfactory tables. They are for Flemish 
Belgium and pertain to married women in the 
20-44 years age range. 
Numbers of cases for tables differ widely. 
Eight tables are taken from a census and refer to 
whole populations. Seven of them pertain to 
more than a million couples. They contrast with 
four tables referring to somewhat less than 1,000 
marriages. The table for Finland in 1972 has the 
lowest number of cases, 617 to be exact. Nine 
tables are taken from public use samples of 
population counts, labour force surveys, etc. 
They have at least some 10,000 cases. 
Differences in numbers of cases create a diffi-
culty that may be elucidated by an example from 
comparative mobility research. Grusky and 
Hauser (1984) in one log-linear analysis 
compared 16 father-to-son mobility tables that 
' / 
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sometimes pertained to somewhat less than one 
thousand cases and mostly to a few thousand 
cases. The largest one referred to some 50,000 
cases, the next largest to about 12,000 cases, and 
the next to some 10,000. A consequence of using 
these original numbers is that one compares the 
tables having few cases with the few based on 
the highest numbers. It is almost impossible for 
a country with a large number of cases to show a 
large residual with respect to estimated models. 
This just does not square with the design of a 
comparative analysis: every country should be 
compared with every other country. Grusky and 
Hauser (1984: 33) try to solve this difficulty by 
examining scatter plots. 
The difficulty of varying numbers is especially 
pressing with tables for more than a million and 
less than 1,000 couples. Under these circum-
stances inspecting plots is out of order. To 
bypass the problem of widely different numbers, 
in the present case all tables were adjusted to a 
base of 1,000 marriages (Erikson and 
Goldthorpe, 1987: 62 is a precedent). The argu-
ment for 1,000 as a base, apart from the neatness 
of this number, was twofold. First, it is not much 
above the original numbers of cases for the 
smallest tables. Secondly, given the global 
character of the hypotheses to be tested, a 
choice for, say, 10,000 as a base, would divert 
attention to the specifics of heterogamy pat-
terns, details that have been bypassed by com-
parative mobility research too. It is acknow-
ledged that more complicated techniques might 
be developed fully using the original number of 
cases. However, a standard methodology is 
lacking, and its development is beyond the scope 
of this article. 
As expected, the original classifications for 
level of education of these 41 tables differed 
from one another. For comparative purposes 
they were reduced to the closest approximation 
of a fourfold scheme. Values of this standard 
variable Educational Level were: (a) at most a 
primary education or compulsory schooling, (b) 
at most a lower-level type of secondary edu-
cation, (c) at most a higher level of secondary 
education, and (d) tertiary education, i.e. uni-
versity, but also professional qualifications 
obtained after higher-level secondary education. 
One intention behind this standard is equal 
distance within and between countries in 
number of years of schooling between the subse-
quent levels. Levels of this standard are (about) 
identical to those of a classification for OECD 
member countries ( OECD, 1972). If the relation 
between education and occupation were fixed 
and straightforward, the lowest level of edu-
cation might stand for lower manual jobs, the 
second lowest for upper manual, the next for 
lower non-manual, and the highest for upper 
non-manual jobs. 
Again predictably, when recoding to standard 
levels, choices between unsatisfactory options 
had to be made. Five tables originally had a 
four-by-four form. These were taken as given. 
All other tables were recoded as well as possible 
into tables with standard educational levels. This 
was done by using a classification of educational 
systems in OECD member countries (OECD, 
1972). Of these recodings, the one for Japan is 
perhaps least satisfactory. In most tables the 
distance between levels in number of years 
seems more or less equal, but for Japan the 
distance between the highest and the second 
highest level is decidedly greater than that 
between other adjacent levels. In Table 1 the 
educational heterogamy tables and the number 
of cases (marriages) are presented. The 
Appendix provides additional information on 
the original surveys. 
To analyze these tables, the next sections of 
this article apply log-linear models. This tech-
nique is appropriate since this article's edu-
cational heterogamy tables pertain to categorical 
data. The specific log-linear models fitted resem-
ble those applied to mobility tables. This is the 
case, since the task of eliminating the conse-
quences of differences in educational structures 
for males and females in the case of educational 
heterogamy is similar to that of controlling for 
the effects of changes in occupational structures 
in research on social mobility. For an exposition 
of log-linear models for mobility tables, see 
Rout (1983). 
The fit of log-linear models until now pri-
marily has been determined by L 2 • Doubts have 
been raised about the application of this conven-
tion. The larger the number of cases, the 
stronger is the punishment these conventions 
mete out for analyzing them (cf. Erikson and 
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TABLE I Cross-classification of married couples according to educational level of husband and wife in 23 
post-war industrial nations 
Country 
Australia 66 
Australia 81 
Austria 7l 
Austria 81 
Belgium, Flanders 76 
Belgium, Flanders 83 
Canada 7l 
Canada 81 
Czechoslovakia 80 
Denmark 72 
England & Wales 49 
England & Wales 72 
Fed. Rep. Germany 7l 
Fed. Rep. Germany 82 
Finland 72 
Finland 81 
France 59 
France 69 
France 81 
Hungary 60 
Hungary 70 
Hungary SO 
Irish Republic 73 
Italy 79 
Japan 55 
Japan 65 
Norway 57 
Norway72 
Northern Ireland 73 
Netherlands 59 
Netherlands 7l 
Netherlands 83 
New Zealand 81 
Poland 82 
Sweden 72 
Sweden 81 
Scotland 73 
United States 62 
United States 73 
United States 83 
Yugoslavia 7l 
13 14 
42 40 
6 12 
13 15 
43 42 
22 19 
16 7 
9 12 
13 12 
23 7 
142 76 32 6 
18 14 42 3 
40 21 52 2 
25 46 5 9 
19 19 15 3 
6 9 7 8 
9 30 13 12 
19 43 16 11 
54 72 30 11 
44 15 11 2 
54 25 
30 26 
55 25 
26 10 
18 4 
16 3 
392026 6 
7 15 17 3 
15 26 17 2 
28 38 15 2 
10 10 16 13 
34 45 8 5 
11 73 21 4 
16 87 10 0 
2 7 
44 51 
13 8 
4 12 
23 26 
19 7 
43 11 
3 26 
19 11 
32 18 
55 67 35 6 
158 33 124 14 
33 27 5 10 
65 38 30 14 
685020 7 
16 30 10 13 
113 93 16 8 
169 123 13 4 
270 135 16 7 
7 14 17 3 
Relative Frequencies<•> 
4 33 27 25 4 
20 183 81 39 8 
2 15 17 33 0 
4 17 22 32 
21 84 82 59 7 
42 129 82 
3 10 38 
8 13 52 
29 16 
6 5 
4 14 
10 115 38 71 3 
7 53 40 18 1 
4 64 17 117 3 
2 522565 0 
4 545248 2 
11 82 93 48 4 
3 32 34 11 8 
22 31 45 26 15 
3 31 26 25 2 
7 55 35 20 9 
12 22 45 8 20 
2 16 35 10 
5 38 49 11 2 
12 7l 62 10 5 
6 11 21 3 
19 96 66 31 4 
6 75 64 17 1 
10 138 95 10 4 
7 11 13 0 
7 55 49 31 8 
7 5 42 0 
15 34 33 0 
6 21 44 31 6 
28 120 135 
21 14 31 
16 97 51 
9 56 61 
30 109 54 
2 49 21 
36 178 51 
46 242 57 
64 221 48 
67 7 
5 72 
55 9 
30 11 
34 8 
60 
22 15 
19 10 
10 12 
2 16 35 10 
13 131 76 6 
64 142 44 6 
3 12 36 
4 22 48 4 
49 132 117 3 
69 152 55 2 
19 365 90 
32 462 76 
83 116 149 
34 143 123 1 
12 18 23 2 
26 49 Ill 1 
42 188 295 0 
51 214 213 0 
23 113 89 0 
37 120 86 8 
28 112 94 1 
45 135 91 2 
36 360 125 3 
8 86 73 0 
29 193 88 0 
63 292 80 0 
8 15 38 2 
34 112 89 0 
55 313 127 0 
80 376 77 0 
6 99 113 1 
44 181 169 3 
5 6 34 1 
9 79 168 0 
29 139 164 2 
61 124 
32 285 
86 70 
34 127 
52 77 
84 2 
40 14 
87 11 
82 4 
78 5 
21 24 56 2 
76 73 36 12 
66 6023 6 
63 50 18 5 
8 86 73 0 
Note: (a) Relative cell frequencies of educational heterogamy tables are given in per thousands: 
first column: highest education males-highest education females, 
second column: highest education males-second highest education females, 
15th column: lowest education males-second lowest education females, 
16th column: lowest education males-lowest education females. 
19 74 520 
45 65 198 
11 52 779 
16 83 694 
23 85 223 
20 46 102 
6 137 243 
4 91 128 
22 21 286 
8 55 461 
61 20 629 
45 66 494 
6 27 193 
4 23 90 
19 112 484 
22 124 349 
9 74 517 
25 64 413 
6 104 168 
3 81 643 
4 88 433 
3 65 254 
24 47 775 
9 33 415 
13 47 173 
5 46 46 
5 120 589 
8 65 231 
31 12 806 
4 40 571 
12 68 379 
23 57 129 
5 67 85 
50 82 311 
19 58 362 
32 82 294 
59 50 586 
55 70 146 
42 44 76 
29 20 32 
3 81 644 
N of cases 
2,333,000 
30,276 
1,705,205 
1,729,065 
3,984 
2,432 
4,605,495 
1,122,304 
30,299 
733 
5,533 
8,513 
126,573 
6,670 
617 
5,522 
1,646 
7,304 
60,000 
2,388,007 
2,324,608 
2,686,441 
1,437 
2,325 
1,586 
1,704 
1,113 
747 
1,759 
10,000 
300,000 
2,808 
643,521 
1,880 
735 
4,148 
3,844 
9,763 
19,527 
1,368 
2,622 
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Goldthorpe, 1987: 60). The (reweighted) 
number of cases analyzed here is relatively 
large, 41,000 to be exact. Given the lack of fit 
according to conventional standards of most 
log-linear models applied until now, RIC-
measures have been proposed as a guideline for 
choosing between models (Raftery, 1986). They 
were calculated by Ultee and Luijkx (1986), 
Hauser and Wong (1989) and Hout (1989). Until 
now no alternative to BIC, nor a criticism of it, 
has appeared in the literature. This article will 
present L 2- and RIC-measures. 
IS HETEROGAMY MUCH THE SAME IN 
INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES? 
Since Lipset and Zetterberg, one issue in com-
parative mobility research is whether or not 
mobility patterns are much the same in indus-
trial societies. Similarity of patterns was first 
interpreted as similarity of gross mobility rates 
and later as that of relative mobility chances. 
These chances were expressed as odds ratios. 
Since Lipset and Zetterberg used data on out-
marriage to buttress their thesis, it is interesting 
to see whether gross rates and relative chances 
of outmarriage are similar in industrial societies. 
For each of the 41 educational heterogamy 
tables featured in this article the percentage of 
heterogamous marriages was calculated. The 
minimum was 17 (Northern Ireland 1973) and 
the maximum 57 (the Netherlands 1983). The 
average heterogamy rate was 38 (standard devi-
ation 10 per cent). It is obvious that an outmar-
riage table version of Lipset and Zetterberg's 
thesis does not hold for rates of educational 
heterogamy in Western industrial societies after 
World War II. This picture of dissimilarity is 
furnished too by percentages for strongly 
heterogamous marriages. If percentages part-
ners differing at least one level of education are 
calculated, the minimum is three (Japan 1965) 
and the maximum 20 (England & Wales 1949). 
The average is nine (standard deviation 4 per 
cent). 
If the notion of similarity of outmarriage 
patterns is interpreted as similarity of relative 
chances, log-linear modelling is appropriate. In 
this article the cross-classification of educational 
level of husband (i) by educational level of wife 
(j) by table (k) is considered. Let M designate 
educational level of husband, F the educational 
level of wife and T the (group) variable Table. 
The expected frequencies for each cell (i,j,k) of 
the 4-by-4-by-41 cross-classification are given by 
the following log-linear equation: 
In F;jk = alik + aljk + azjk + b;jk 
J 
where: I azjk = 0, alik = a1jk fori= j (1) 
j=l 
b;jk = bjik fori =f j, b;jk = 0 fori= j 
(i = 1.. .4; j = 1...4; k = 1.. .41) 
The alik and aljk are size effects, i.e. the effects 
that express the total size of each of the edu-
cational level categories for each of the 
countries; the azjk are the structural difference 
effects, i.e. the effects that show the differences 
in educational distributions for husbands and 
wives (for each educationallevelj and each table 
k); and the b;jk effects are the (symmetric) 
association effects. The Goodman notation is 
used to express hierarchical log-linear models. 4 
The models considered here are all conditional 
threeway tables. Because we assume the 
association in the k tables to be symmetric, we 
will label the constrained twoway marginal [MFJ 
as [Sym]. 5 
The model of Conditional Homogeneous 
Quasi-Symmetry tests whether or not the same 
pattern of symmetric association holds for all41 
tables ([MT][FT][Sym], Model 6 in Table 2). 
The test statistic (U) for this model is 1 ,216·4 
with 363 degrees of freedom. The conclusion is 
that the tables differ in the relative chances of 
heterogamy. 6 
The model of Conditional Heterogeneous 
Quasi-Symmetry assumes different patterns of 
symmetric association for the 41 tables 
([MT][FT][SymT], Model 9 in Table 2). The 
result (U = 77·2 and 123 df) indicates that this 
article's data satisfy Sobel, Hout and Duncan's 
(1985) condition of symmetric association. This 
gives impetus to fitting other, more par-
simonious, symmetric models later on in this 
article. It also shows that the (symmetric) 
association in the 41 tables differs significantly 
(U = 1,139·2 with 240 df). 
The findings of this section contradict the 
\ 
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TABLE 2 Goodness-of-fit statistics for log-linear models for 
cross-classification of married couples according to edu-
cational level of husband and wife in 23 post-war industrial 
nations 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
Models<•> 
Grand Mean 
[T][H][Sym] 
[T][H][SymT] 
[TJ[MJ[FJ[Sym] 
[TJ[M][F][SymT] 
[MT][FT][Sym] 
[HTJ[SymT] 
[HT][D ][SymT] 
[MT][FT][SymT] 
[6]-[9] 
[7]-[9] 
[7]-[8] 
[8]-[9] 
[MT][FT][Step] 
[MT][FTJ[StepT] 
[MT][FT][Step] 
[StepSD ][StepSS] 
[StepA ][StepT1] 
[StepT2] 
[10]-[11] 
[10]-[12] 
[12]-[11] 
[MT][FT][Step ][Dia] 
[MT][FT][StepT] 
[DiaT] 
[MTJ[FT][Step] 
[StepSD ][StepSS] 
[StepA][StepTl] 
[StepT2] 
[13]-[14] 
[13]-[15] 
[15]-[14] 
[HT][Shift][SymT] 
[HT][ShiftT][SymT] 
[HT][Shift J[ShiftSS] 
[ShiftSD][ShiftA] 
[ShiftT1 ][ShiftT2] 
[SymT] 
[16]-[17] 
[16]-[18] 
[18]-[17] 
69,267 
20,845 
15,039 
19,555 
13,748 
1,216·4 
2,835·4 
1,544·0 
77·2 
1,139·2 
2,758·2 
1,291·4 
1,466·8 
1,499·3 
939·4 
1,425·3 
559·9 
74·5 
485·9 
1,434·4 
594·9 
1,271·6 
839·5 
162·8 
676·7 
1,854·7 
1,077-8 
1,662·6 
776·9 
192·1 
584·8 
df 
655 
606 
366 
603 
363 
363 
246 
243 
123 
240 
123 
3 
120 
368 
328 
363 
40 
5 
35 
367 
287 
357 
80 
10 
70 
245 
205 
240 
40 
5 
35 
bic 
62,310 
14,408 
11,152 
13,150 
9,892 
-2,639 
223 
-1,037 
-1,229 
-2,409 
-2,544 
-2,430 
-2,464 
-2,453 
-2,520 
-748 
-1,100 
-887 
Note: (a) F = Wife's Educational Level; M = Husband's 
Educational Level; T = Table; Sym = Symmetric 
Association; Step = Fixed Distances; Dia = Main 
Diagonal effect; H = Halfway; D = Structural 
Difference; Shift= Systematic Shift in the Marginals; 
A = School Selection at Age of 12; SD = Years of 
Social Democratic Government; SS = Years of State 
Socialist Government; #Telephones per thousand 
one year (Tl) and 21 years (T2) before survey. 
classical argument and possibly support the rival 
one. Since this article's final section will 
determine whether differences in educational 
heterogamy between countries compensate 
those in father-to-son mobility, a full answer to 
this article's first question will be given in that 
section. 
IS THERE A TREND TOWARDS MORE 
HETEROGAMY IN INDUSTRIAL 
SOCIETIES? 
To answer trend questions, this section uses a 
special feature of the data: for 14 countries more 
than one outmarriage table is available. For 
these countries pairs of tables were formed, and 
for countries with three tables two pairs (consist-
ing of its first and second, and of its first and 
third table), resulting in a total of 18 pairs. This 
allows for a neat answer to the double question 
of whether gross rates of education heterogamy 
have increased and relative chances of edu-
cational heterogamy have become more equal. 
When analyzing differences in gross 
heterogamy rates between later and earlier 
tables of a pair, five pairs display negative and 13 
positive differences. The average difference is 
positive (7 per cent). This confirms the 
hypothesis that there is a trend towards higher 
rates of gross heterogamy. This hyp9thesis is 
corroborated by differences in percentages 
between strongly heterogamous marriages. In 
that case, six differences are negative and 12 
positive. The average difference is positive, this 
time only 1 per cent. Countries going against this 
trend are Flemish Belgium, Japan, and the 
United States. 
To answer the question about relative chances 
the Fixed Distance Model (Haberman, 1979: 
500-503) was applied.? In case of heterogamy 
tables, this model represents the hypothesis that 
the larger the educational differences between 
males and females, the fewer the number of 
marriages. We will express this term by [Step]. 
The interpretation of the parameter is straight-
forward: the less negative a Step parameter, the 
more open is a marriage pattem.8 
The model of Conditional Heterogeneous 
Fixed Distance ([M1][F1][Step1])9 was applied 
to every pair of the 18 pairs of heterogamy tables 
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TABLE 3 Goodness-of-fit statistics and parameter estimates for the log-linear model [MJ[F]{Step] in 18 post-war 
industrial nations compared at two points in time 
Parameter Change in 
Country<•> L2Cb> Early Table< c) Second Table<ctl Conditional Test<•> 
Australia 66--81 38·9 0·39 1-09 1·37 
Austria 71-81 11·1* 0·39 1-12 1·40 
Belgium. Flanders 76--82 40·5 0·48 0·86 6·22* 
Canada 71-81 26·9* 0·37 1-03 0·10 
England & Wales 49-72 73-0 0·58 0·90 2·56 
FRG 71-82 72-4 0·37 1-01 0·01 
Finland 72-81 43·4 0·35 1·34 18·37* 
France 59-69 34·2 0·33 1·04 0·28 
France 59-81 25·4* 0·33 1·29 10·94* 
Hungary 60-70 42·6 0·28 1·02 0·06 
Hungary 60-80 52·8 0·28 1·02 0·05 
Japan 55-65 86·3 0·33 1·04 0·21 
Netherlands 59-71 32·3 0·34 1·31 8·72* 
Netherlands 59-83 62·2 0·34 1·48 20·59* 
Norway 57-72 35·8 0·43 0·98 0·08 
Sweden 72-81 36·6 0·38 1-12 2·98 
USA62-73 22·5* 0·44 0·90 2·69 
USA 62-83 20·2* 0·44 0·91 2·23 
Notes: (a) Years next to a country indicate year of early and recent table. 
(b) Degrees of freedom in all cases: 16 (critical value: 33). 
(c) Multiplicative Step-parameter for the first table. 
(d) Step-parameter in second table relative to Step-parameter in the first table. 
(e) Conditional test with one degree of freedom of [MT][FTJ[StepT] vs. [MT][FT][Step] on equality of parameter 
Step in both tables. 
* p<O·Ol. 
just analyzed. It embodies the hypothesis that, 
given marginal differences, within a country 
some trend in relative chances of heterogamy 
exists. As judged by U (see Column 1 of Table 
3) the fit of the model is acceptable in five cases, 
and about the same number of tables comes 
close to it. From the parameters in Columns 2 
and 3, it appears that there is a slight trend 
towards more openness. Of 18 changes 13 are in 
this direction. To determine significances, the 
model just discussed was compared with the 
model of Conditional Homogeneous Fixed Dis-
tance ([MT][FT][Step]). Five of the conditional 
test statistics (Column 4 of Table 3) for the test 
of equality of the association ([MT][FT][StepT] 
vs. [MT][FT][Step]) in the two tables of each 
country are significant; of these, four are in the 
direction of more openness. For Flemish 
Belgium 1976-1982 there is a significant trend 
towards closure; for Finland 1972-1981, France 
1959-1981, the Netherlands 1959-1971, and the 
Netherlands 1959-1983, there is a significant 
trend towards openness. 
To sum up: on the whole rates of heterogamy 
have increased. Relative chances of heterogamy 
have become somewhat more equal, but no 
more than that. Although these findings do not 
provide strong support for the argument that 
heterogamy has increased, they more sharply 
contradict the hypothesis postulating a trend 
towards less heterogamy. The conclusion of no 
trend seems too easy. 
DIFFERENCES IN HETEROGAMY 
BETWEEN COUNTRIES EXPLAINED 
Empirical indicators 
When devising empirical indicators of economic 
and political factors for a comparative analysis 
\ ) 
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of outmarriage tables, a difficulty becomes 
apparent in comparative research pertaining to 
total populations of nations. Why determine 
associations between heterogamy measured in a 
certain year and country characteristics for that 
same year? Did not most people marry long 
before, is not the education of most persons 
fixed in early life? From a similar perspective 
Hewitt in 1977 criticized then current studies of 
industrial societies in which a country's degree 
of income inequality is taken as a variable to be 
explained, and economic and political factors as 
exogenous variables. In the studies criticized by 
Hewitt, the latter factors were ascertained for 
the same date as income inequality. Hewitt 
(1977: 459), in contrast, measured social-
democratic government as the average legislat-
ive strength of socialist parties between 1945 and 
1965. Hewitt's historical way of measuring 
exogenous variables is followed here. 
One exogenous variable (SD) used in the 
analysis is the number of years of social-
democracy in the 40 years preceding a particular 
survey, another one (SS) is the number of years 
of state socialism during that period. A period of 
40 years was chosen because of the possible 
incremental effects of government policies and 
the duration of older marriages. The main 
sources for figures were De Swaan (1973) and 
Keesing's Contemporary Archives (several 
years). A year of coalition government of a 
social-democratic party with a party to its right 
was counted as half a year. Another measure 
(A) ascertains whether 20 years before the date 
of an outmarriage table, a country's school 
system selected pupils (tracking according to 
ability) before or after the age of 12. The lag of 
20 years is somewhat arbitrary, but given 
Hewitt's criticism a measure for a nation's 
present educational laws is clearly wide of the 
mark. Information about this characteristic was 
taken from sections on a country's educational 
system in encyclopedias. 
If economic factors are to be measured in a 
historical way, familiar measures like gross 
national product per capita at purchasing power 
parities or per capita energy consumption are 
not always available. In addition, these 
measures are less reliable for state socialist 
countries. Instead, data for economic develop-
TABLE 4 Exogenous variables measured for 23 post-war 
industrial nations 
Country and Year 
Australia 66 
Australia 81 
Austria 71 
Austria 81 
Belgium, Flanders 76 
Belgium, Flanders 83 
Canada 71 
Canada 81 
Czechoslovakia 80 
Denmark 72 
England & Wales 49 
England & Wales 72 
FRG 71 Germany 71 
FRG 82 Germany 82 
Finland 72 
Finland 81 
France 59 
France 69 
France 81 
Hungary 60 
Hungary 70 
Hungary 80 
Irish Republic 73 
Italy 79 
Japan 55 
Japan 65 
Netherlands 59 
Netherlands 71 
Netherlands 83 
New Zealand 81 
Northern Ireland 73 
Norway 57 
Norway72 
Poland 82 
Scotland 73 
Sweden 72 
Scotland 81 
United States 62 
United States 73 
United States 83 
Yugoslavia 71 
T1<al J'2(bl so<c> SS<d> A<•> 
248 110 9·0 0·0 0 
489 210 12·0 0·0 0 
193 53 11·0 0·0 1 
401 99 20·0 0·0 1 
285 99 12·0 0·0 1 
401 138 11·5 0·0 1 
452 211 0·0 0·0 0 
686 322 0·0 0·0 0 
201 69 0·0 33·0 0 
356 176 13·5 0·0 1 
97 36 8·5 0·0 1 
289 111 13·0 0·0 1 
225 50 2·0 0·0 1 
488 80 7·5 0·0 1 
278 89 12·0 0·0 1 
496 136 20·0 0·0 1 
83 39 7·0 0·0 1 
150 54 7·0 0·0 1 
459 96 4·5 0·0 1 
24 18 0·0 13·5 1 
76 12 0·0 23·5 0 
111 24 0·0 33·5 0 
115 34 3·0 0·0 1 
301 61 6·0 0·0 1 
32 11 0·0 0·0 1 
126 19 0·0 0·0 1 
125 48 7·0 0·0 1 
241 70 8·0 0·0 1 
371 160 9·5 0·0 1 
560 314 15·0 0·0 0 
202 75 0·0 0·0 1 
177 78 15·5 0·0 1 
307 138 22·0 0·0 1 
97 32 0·0 36·0 0 
294 110 13·0 0·0 1 
557 238 27 ·0 0·0 0 
796 353 28·5 0·0 0 
421 173 0·0 0·0 0 
628 305 0·0 0·0 0 
790 434 0·0 0·0 0 
36 7 0·0 26·0 0 
Notes: (a) T1: number of telephones per 1,000 inhabitants 
one year before heterogamy table; 
(b) T2: number of telephones per 1,000 21 years 
before heterogamy table; 
(c) SO: number of years of social-democratic 
government in the 40 years before heterogamy table; 
(d) SS: number of years of state socialist government 
in the 40 years before heterogamy table; 
(e) A: school selection of pupils at the age of 12, 20 
years before a heterogamy table (0 = no selection, 1 
= selection). 
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ment were found in numbers of telephones per 
capita in a country. Data were assembled for 
one year (Tl) and 21 years (T2) before the date 
of an outmarriage table. Hewitt's criticism led to 
choosing T2, whereas T1 was collected as a 
check upon it. Older data were taken from 
Banks (1971), more recent data from United 
Nations (several years). Data for Scotland and 
Northern Ireland have been estimated. From 
regional statistics it is known that in the seven-
ties the number of telephones per capita in 
Northern Ireland is 0·64 of that in England and 
Wales. For Scotland this figure is 0·94 (Eurostat, 
1979: 345). These figures were applied to earlier 
numbers of telephones as well. Scores for all 
exogenous variables are given in Table 4. 
A test of hypotheses on relative outmarriage 
chances 
Given a shift in interest from gross mobility rates 
to relative mobility chances, effects of exogen-
ous variables on relative chances of heterogamy 
will now be examined. There are several ways of 
doing so. Exogenous variables may be entered 
as covariates into models that capture relative 
chances of heterogamy very parsimoniously by 
effects like Step, into models that devour 
degrees of freedom like Sym, or into models 
somewhere in between. The choice here is a 
difficult one. If parameters are to be interpreted, 
models that fit according to some statistical 
standard are to be preferred. But when includ-
ing exogenous variables, models that fit in this 
way may yield so many parameters that one does 
not see the wood for the trees. Given the fit of 
Model 9 in Table 2-the model of Conditional 
Heterogeneous Quasi-Symmetry-, the former 
rule suggests replacing T in that model by all 
exogenous variables. The latter one, however, 
rules out this model as a first choice: with five 
exogenous variables, that model would yield 50 
parameters. The first choice of this article there-
fore is a model including Step. 
The model of Conditional Homogeneous 
Fixed Distances ([MT][FT][Step], 10 Model10 in 
Table 2) has an U of 1,499·3 with 368 degrees of 
freedom. The model of Conditional Hetero-
geneous Fixed Distances ([MT][FT][StepT], 
Model 11 in Table 2) has an U of 939·4 with 328 
degrees of freedom. These results indicate that 
the exogenous variables can at most explain 
559·9 U-points. 
In Model 12 of Table 2 the interaction terms 
of the exogenous variables A, SD, SS, Tl, and 
T2 with Step are included. It yields an improve-
ment of 74·5L2 with five degrees of freedom. 
This improvement is significant, although not 
substantial (13 per cent of all that exogenous 
variables can explain). Model 12 does not fit 
according to the conventional standard of U. Its 
RIC-measure is -2,430, whereas the RIC-
measure for Model 10 is -2,409. This result is 
not unsatisfactory. It would have been more 
satisfactory if the RIC for Model 12 had been 
lower than that for Modelll (-2,544). 
To obtain a model that is satisfactory in this 
respect, less parsimonious models were applied. 
Models were employed that specify effects of 
exogenous variables on Step and Dia. Dia is an 
effect that contrasts all cells on the main di-
agonal of a table with those off it. If Dia is 
included, Step models the association in off-
diagonal cells. Thus the assumption is dropped 
that relative heterogamy is one four-by-four 
table may be captured by one parameter (Step); 
heterogamy now is being modelled by two par-
ameters. This yields Models 13, 14, and 15 in 
Table 2. 
Again the model including the exogenous 
variables does not fit according to conventional 
standards. With 357 degrees of freedom, Model 
15 in Table 2 has an U of 1,271·6. Its RIC of 
-2,520, however, is more negative than that of 
Model14 ( -2,453) and than the RIC of Model13 
(-2,464). This is a more satisfactory result. 
A comparison of Models 13 and 14 in Table 2 
makes clear that exogenous variables can 
explain at most 839·5 U-points. A comparison 
of Models 13 and 15 indicates that it explains 
162·8 U-points (19 per cent of all there is to 
explain). This reduction is significant but not 
substantial. Although exact comparisons are not 
possible, it is clear that similar exogenous vari-
ables explain more in the log-linear models for 
intergenerational mobility tables reported by 
Grusky and Hauser (1984: Table 5) and Ultee 
and Luijkx (1986: Table 4). We return to this 
finding in our discussion. 
If Model 15 is preferred, the next question is 
about its parameter estimates. As this model, 
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TABLE 5 Parameter estimates and standard errorrs for 
Mode/15 [ MT][FT][Step][StepSD ][StepSS][StepAJ[Step Tl} 
[StepT2}[Dia}[DiaSDJ[DiaSS}[DiaAJ[DiaTJJ[DiaT2} 
Parameter 
estimates Standard errors 
Step --0·807 (0·084) 
StepSD* 0·940 (0·237) 
StepSS* --0·728 (0·287) 
StepA --0·209 (0·065) 
StepT1 * -1·413 (0·246) 
StepT2* 2·474 (0·520) 
Dia 0·426 (0·118) 
DiaSD* 0·664 (0·343) 
DiaSS* -1·525 (0·401) 
DiaA --0·491 (0·092) 
DiaTl* -1·901 (0·334) 
DiaT2* 2·283 (0·720) 
*Metric coefficient and standard error multiplied by 1,000. 
according to conventional standards does not fit, 
the interpretation of the parameters of the 
model must be tentative. 
According to Table 5, nine out of ten para-
meters for the covariation of exogenous vari-
ables with Step and Dia are significant. Social 
democracy decreases the tendency to marry 
exact equals, but among the educationally mixed 
marriages, it does not make for larger differen-
ces in education between spouses. These effects 
are net of those of educational laws, so perhaps 
the significant parameter is the more surprising 
one for the classical argument outlined earlier: 
social democracy, after allowing for the edu-
cational laws it favours, in one respect still 
makes for more relative heterogamy. Selection 
of pupils after the age of 12 on both counts does 
make for more heterogamy. 11 The two effects of 
state socialism have the sign opposite to that 
predicted by the classical argument: state 
socialism makes for less heterogamy. 
The parameters. for number of telephones per 
capita 21 years before an outmarriage table have 
the sign expected according to the classical 
argument: economic development makes for 
outmarriage. Number of telephones per capita 
one year after an outmarriage table was intro-
duced as an exogenous variable to check 
Hewitt's argument about historical measures. 
The parameters for the effects of this exogenous 
variable are opposite to those of its sister vari-
able. Although this finding attests to the import-
ance of Hewitt's argument about historical 
measurement of variables in comparative 
research, it is difficult to make sense of it. 
No overall judgement seems possible about 
the classical and the rival argument. The proper 
conclusion is that if exogenous variables have 
effects on heterogamy, they are smaller than 
those on mobility. 
A test of hypotheses on marriage market 
opportunity structures 
Until now marginal frequences were fitted 
exactly for each table ([MT][F1J). This section 
models differences between the marginals of the 
educational level variables of husband and wife. 
Its starting point is a relatively new question for 
comparative mobility research. When shifting 
attention from gross mobility rates to relative 
mobility chances, consequences of variations in 
origin and destination distributions are dis-
carded. Hauser and Featnerman (1977: 170) 
have argued that more attention to this phenom-
enon, sometimes termed structural mobility, is 
appropriate. 
In the case of outmarriage tables, two in-
terpretations of variations in marginal frequen-
cies exist. If all males and females are married, 
and if the educational distribution for married 
males displays higher education than that for 
married females, differences between marginals 
tell about gender inequality in education. This 
inequality may be smaller in some than in other 
countries, and larger in certain than in other 
times. Questions about gender inequality in 
education form a relevant subquestion of the 
general problem of stratification, just like ques-
tions about mobility and heterogamy. In ad-
dition, the extent of gender inequality with 
respect to education in one country may be 
regarded as the (un)favourableness of an oppor-
tunity structure, as the chances of a person to 
find a spouse with the same or higher level of 
education. This degree of competitive imbalance 
in a marriage market may differ from country to 
country and from time to time, and questions 
about it are a proper part of questions on 
outmarriage. 
Log-linear models for the marginals of 
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mobility tables were developed by Hope (1981b) 
and Sobel, Hout and Duncan (1985). The lat-
ter's size effects12 had been labelled Halfway 
effects by Hope. Hope also introduced a model 
assuming a linear constraint on Sobel, Hout and 
Duncan's structural difference effects,B a con-
straint which he labelled Shift. This Shift effect 
postulates that the lack of correspondence 
between the marginals of an educational 
heterogamy table is a regular inequality, women 
having systematically less (or more) education 
than males. If males have more education than 
females, the marriage market opportunity struc-
ture for males is unfavourable and for females 
favourable. We use H to designate size effects, D 
for structural difference effects, and Shift for shift 
effects. 
Are there gender inequalities within one 
country and, if so, are they pretty much the 
same in industrial societies? Comparison of the 
model of Conditional Heterogeneous Symmetry 
([HT][SymT], Model 7 in Table 2) and the 
model of Conditional Heterogeneous Quasi-
Symmetry ([MT][FT][SymT], 14 Model 9 in 
Table 2) yields an U reduction of 2,758·2 with 
123 degrees of freedom. This result indicates 
that gender inequalities in each country indeed 
exist. In addition gender inequalities are not the 
same in all tables: comparison of Model 
[HT][D][SymT] and Model [MT][FT][SymT] 
yields an U of 1,466·8 with 120 degrees of 
freedom. Assuming a linear constraint in the 
marginal differences the conditional test results 
in 776·9 with 40 degrees of freedom (Table 2, 
Models 16 and 17). 
Since there are differences between tables 
with respect to gender inequalities, the question 
of how to explain them arises. The classical 
argument predicts that social-democracy, state 
socialism and selection of pupils after the age of 
12 years redress inequalities between edu-
cational structures for males and females ( cf. 
Dobson, 1978). Also according to this argu-
ment, economic development should lead to 
smaller gender inequalities in education. The 
rival argument predicts that economic and 
political factors have no effects. If women start 
entering a higher level of education, as a defence 
men will increasingly enter an even higher one. 
Model 18 in Table 2 specifies the interaction 
TABLE 6 Parameter estimates and standard errors for 
Mode/18 {MTJ[FTJ[Shift/[ShiftSD/[ShiftSS/[ShiftA/ 
[ShiftTI /{Shift12/ 
Parameter 
estimates Standard errors 
Shift -0·153 (0·030) 
ShiftSD* 0·140 (0·089) 
ShiftSS* 0·010 (0·098) 
ShiftA -0·125 (0·024) 
ShiftTl* -0·140 (0·088) 
ShiftT2* 0·540 (0·188) 
*Metric coefficient and standard error multiplied by 1,000. 
of the exogenous variables with the Shift in 
structural differences and table-specific 
Symmetry effects. It contains the hypotheses 
about effects of exogenous variables on marginal 
differences just outlined. Compared with Model 
16, Model18 for five degrees of freedom yields a 
decrease of 192·1 U. This is a significant, 
although not a substantial, reduction (25 per 
cent of all that can be explained). Model18 does 
not fit according to conventional standards, 
making interpretation of its parameters tenta-
tive. The BIC of Model18 is not unsatisfactory. 
To see whether hypotheses on consequences 
of economic and political factors on gender 
inequality are corroborated or disconfirmed, 
signs of parameters for Model18 were consulted 
(see Table 6). The parameters for the effect of 
number of telephones per capita 21 years before 
an heterogamy table and educational laws on 
Shift are significant, while those for number of 
telephones ' one year before a table, social 
democracy, and state socialism are not. Findings 
about effects of number of telephones are in line 
with Hewitt's argument about measurement in 
comparative research. 
The signs of the parameters for number of 
telephones 21 years before a table, social 
democracy and educational laws are as expected 
according to the classical argument: if a 
country's level of economic development is 
higher, if the number of years of social-
democratic government is higher, and if schools 
select pupils after the age of 12, gender 
inequality in education is smaller. All in all the 
classical argument is upheld. 
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EDUCATIONAL HETEROGAMY AND 
FATHER-TO-SON OCCUPATIONAL 
MOBILITY 
Finally, the issue of whether countries with more 
equal relative chances of father-to-son occu-
pational mobility have more equal or less equal 
relative chances of educational heterogamy can 
be addressed. If more equal relative mobility 
goes together with more equal relative 
heterogamy, the classical argument is vindi-
cated. If it is found that more equal mobility 
chances go together with less equal heterogamy 
chances, the rival argument is upheld. A similar 
question may be asked for gross mobility and 
heterogamy rates. 
To answer these questions, data were taken 
from two benchmark studies on comparative 
father-to-son mobility. From Grusky and 
Hauser (1984) were taken tables for Australia, 
Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of 
Germany, Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, 
Japan, Norway, Sweden, United States, and 
Yugoslavia. Several of these tables also figure in 
Heath (1981). From the latter study were taken 
data for Canada, England & Wales, and Poland. 
Data for Austria were taken from Haller (1982), 
data for Czechoslovakia from Connor (1979: 
119), data for the Irish Republic from Rout and 
Jackson (1986). Tables for the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Northern Ireland, and Scotland 
were obtained from Ganzeboom, Luijkx and 
Treiman (1989). The uneven quality of these 
data is acknowledged. For that reason alone, the 
comparison to be presented is tentative. How-
ever, a set of high-quality tables is being ac-
cumulated (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1987). 
All 23 intergenerational mobility tables (see 
Table 7) originally were based on a non-manual-
manual-farm classification. Manual and farm 
categories were collapsed, yielding an approxi-
mately ordinal classification. (Movement 
between non-ordered categories like farm and 
manual, do not tell about a society's openness in 
a strict sense.) For each resulting table the 
percentage of mobile persons, and the odds ratio 
(that is, the relative chances of mobility), were 
calculated. Each mobility table of a country was 
paired with the educational heterogamy table 
for this country. If two outmarriage tables were 
available, the one closest in time was chosen. 
TABLE 7 Father-to-son occupational mobility data for 23 
post-war industrial nations. 
Country Relative Frequencies(•) 
Australia 1965 158 107 200 535 
Austria 1976 254 82 227 437 
Belgium, Flanders 1968 295 67 239 399 
Canada 1974 214 73 275 438 
Czechoslovakia 1967 78 49 253 620 
Denmark 1972 174 79 176 571 
England & Wales 1972 196 105 226 473 
Fed. Rep. Germany 1969 ·301 93 173 433 
Finland 1972 97 77 158 668 
France 1964 233 115 186 466 
Hungary 1963 46 19 161 774 
Hungary 1982 109 116 165 610 
Irish Republic 1973 137 79 174 610 
Italy 1963 174 63 131 632 
Italy 1972 195 102 210 493 
Japan 1965 236 73 225 466 
Netherlands 1982 304 109 236 351 
New Zealand 1973 273 121 267 339 
Northern Ireland 1973 89 57 178 676 
Norway 1972 209 79 262 450 
Poland 1972 72 79 143 706 
Scotland 1973 96 74 213 617 
Sweden 1972 198 67 241 494 
Sweden 1974 158 95 244 503 
United States 1962 181 86 251 482 
Yugoslavia 1962 89 46 167 698 
Note: (a) Relative cell frequencies of intergenerational 
mobility tables are given in per thousands and in the 
following order: 
(1) non-manual father-non-manual son 
(2) non-manual father-manual or farm son 
(3) namual or farm father-non-manual-son 
(4) manual or farm father-manual or farm son. 
Four-by-four classifications of outmarriage 
tables were left intact. For each outmarriage 
table the percentage of heterogamous marriages 
and the Step parameter of the log-linear model 
[M][FJ[Step] was used. When comparing data 
for father-to-son mobility and for heterogamy, 
in 12 out of 23 cases mobility and heterogamy 
tables come from different surveys. This makes 
comparisons even more awkward. Also, 
Belgium's mobility table pertains to the whole 
country, while its heterogamy table pertains to 
Flanders. 15 Belgian data might be more un-
reliable than those for other countries. 
Table 8 gives these four statistics for this 
article's 23 countries. All odds ratios are above 
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TABLE 8 Comparison of father-to-son occupational mobility and heterogamy data for 23 post-war industrial nations 
odds ratio 
Country<•l mobility rate<bl heterogamy rate<<l mobility<ctl 
Australia 65--66 31 30 3·9 
,'_ustria 76-81 31 25 6·0 
Belgium, Flanders 68-76 31 52 7·4 
Canada 7 4-71 35 37 4·7 
Czechoslovakia 67-80 30 46 3·9 
Denmark 72-72 26 32 H 
England & Wales 72-72 33 40 3-9 
FR Germany 69-71 27 55 8·1 
Finland 72-72 24 33 5·3 
France 64-69 30 34 5-l 
Hungary 63--60 18 25 11·6 
Irish Republic 73-73 25 19 6·1 
Italy 64-79 19 34 13·2 
Japan 65--65 30 43 6·7 
Netherlands 82-83 34 57 4-1 
New Zealand 73-81 39 46 2·9 
Northern Ireland 73-73 24 17 5·9 
Norway 72-72 34 49 4·5 
Poland 72-82 22 49 4·5 
Scotland 73-73 29 33 3·8 
Sweden 72-72 31 39 6·1 
United States 62--62 34 49 4·0 
Yugoslavia 62-71 21 25 8·1 
Alternative items: 
Hungary 82-80 28 36 3·5 
Italy 72-79 31 34 4·5 
Sweden 74-81 34 45 3·4 
Notes: (a) Next to country name: year of mobility and heterogamy table; 
(b) Percentages Males Mobile into and out of the Non-Manual Category; 
(c) Percentages Educationally Heterogamous Couples; 
(d) Odds ratio for Non-Manual/Otherwise Mobility; 
step parameter 
heterogamy<•) 
0·39 
0·44 
0·48 
0·37 
0·41 
0·31 
0·52 
0·37 
0·35 
0·34 
0·28 
0·45 
0·29 
0·34 
0·50 
0·57 
0·52 
0·42 
0·52 
0·51 
0·38 
0·44 
0·28 
0·29 
0·29 
0·43 
(e) Step-parameter of the Log-linear Model [M][FJ[Step) for an Educational Homogamy Table; 
odds ratio 
heterogamy< f) 
13·1 
21·0 
7·5 
13·6 
8·4 
22·9 
8·1 
13-3 
25·9 
16·7 
45·3 
10·5 
24·4 
13·4 
5·0 
5·0 
8·8 
12·0 
5·0 
8·0 
11·5 
8·9 
44·2 
16·3 
24·4 
12·2 
) (f) Odds ratio for Lower/Higher Educational Heterogamy. 
~'J 
) 
unity, implying a positive relation between 
fathers' and sons' occupations in every country; 
all Step parameters are below unity, standing for 
a positive relation between husband's and wife's 
education in each nation. 16 
The correlation between the percentage of 
intergenerationally mobile men in a country and 
the educational heterogamy rate, turns out to be 
0·51. The correlation between the odds ratio for 
a country's mobility table and the Step para-
meter for a country's educational heterogamy 
takes on the value of -0·67. The latter negative 
sign implies that if relative mobility chances in a 
country are more equal, relative heterogamy 
chances are so too. Given the way scores for 
countries were obtained, there is not much point 
in calculating the significance of correlations. 
The correlations just reported are not only 
tentative because of the uneven quality of the 
mobility data, but also because they are based 
on small numbers. To alleviate these difficulties 
somewhat, four checks were made on their 
stability. First, without (Flemish) Belgium the 
correlation between relative mobility and rela-
tive heterogamy takes on the value of -0·70. 
Secondly, inspection of mobility odds ratios 
makes clear that relative mobility chances are 
less equal in Sweden than in England & Wales. 
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This is at variance with the conclusion of 
Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero (1982) 
that Sweden surpasses England & Wales in 
equality of relative mobility chances, and sug-
gests something amiss with the 1972 survey from 
which for Table 8 Sweden's mobility data were 
taken. In fact, Sweden's heterogamy table was 
taken from the same survey. Taking the odds 
ratio from Erikson, Goldthorpe and 
Portocarero's 1974 mobility table for Sweden, 
and the Step parameter from the other 
heterogamy table for Sweden used in this article 
(see the bottom rows of Table 8), it is possible to 
replace the original values for this country by 
better ones. This substitution yields a correl-
ation of -0·66. Thirdly, Hungary and Italy have 
very high odds ratios, turning them into 
influential cases. For these countries substitute 
tables were found in Ganzeboom, Luijkx and 
Treiman (1989) (again see the bottom rows of 
Table 8). The correlation between odds ratio 
and Step parameter now is -0·37. This amounts 
to a substantially lower association, but the 
coefficient maintains its sign. Fourthly, all three 
changes just detailed were implemented at the 
same time. This yielded a correlation of -0·45 
between mobility odds ratio and heterogamy 
Step parameter. In this case the correlation 
between gross mobility rate and gross 
heterogamy rate is 0·48. 
These four checks on a tentative result are 
encouraging. To some extent relative chances of 
father-to-son occupational mobility and relative 
chances of educational outmarriage do seem to 
go together. So do gross mobility and 
heterogamy rates. With the limited means at 
hand, some support has been found for the 
classical argument. 
This tentative result not only implies that the 
rival answer to this article's fourth question is 
untenable. It also suggests that the support 
found earlier on for the rival answer to this 
article's first question was spurious. 
Dissimilarity in educational heterogamy was 
predicted and found, but this prediction 
assumed a compensatory interdependency. At 
that time, its occurrence was not ascertained. 
Now that this hypothesis has been found want-
ing, the earlier affirmation of the rival argument 
has lost its force. 
Now an extra question and a bonus result. b 
relative heterogamy within one country more 
equal or less equal than relative father-to-son 
occupational mobility? It is, of course, imposs-
ible to compare the odds ratio for father-to-son 
mobility in a country with the Step parameter for 
educational heterogamy in that country. The 
former measure is based on a two-by-two 
classification, and the latter one on a four-bv-
four classification. However, by combining the 
two lowest levels of education (primarily geared 
at manual jobs), and the two highest levels 
(aiming at non-manual occupations), a two-by-
two educational heterogamy table is obtained. 
Odds ratios for the latter tables are presented in 
the last column of Table 8. The correlation 
between the odds ratio for educational 
heterogamy and the Step parameter for 
heterogamy is -0·78, indicating that collapsing 
does not lead to unacceptable results. In ad-
dition, the correlation between the odds ratio 
for mobility and that for educational 
heterogamy is 0·68 (0·49 for the series with the 
alternative items). 
If now for each country its odds ratio for 
father-to-son occupational mobility is compared 
with its odds ratio for educational heterogamy, 
an interesting finding is obtained. It turns out 
that in each comparison the odds ratio for 
heterogamy is higher than that for mobility. A 
father-to-son mobility table displays more open-
ness than an educational heterogamy table. 
DISCUSSION 
This article set out to collect tables for edu-
cational heterogamy in industrial societies. For 
23 countries 41 tables were obtained. Although 
these numbers are high compared with the 
numbers of tables and countries dealt with in 
studies on father-to-son occupational mobility 
typical of the 1980s, statistically speaking they 
are low enough to emphasize the tentativeness 
of this article's conclusions. Caution is in order 
too because of the interpretation of parameters 
of log-linear models that according to traditional 
standards do not fit, and the uneven quality of 
the father-to-son mobility data employed. 
The broader issue addressed by analyzing 
these tables was whether educational 
\ ) 
) 
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heterogamy and father-to-son mobility provide 
indications of societal openness that are 
different in kind, or whether openness is a 
general societal phenomenon. It was tackled by 
developing two alternative sets of hypotheses 
answering four specific questions. Three of these 
questions were similar to questions current in 
comparative father-to-son mobility research. 
The first question was whether patterns of 
heterogamy are similar in industrial societies. 
The second was whether there is a trend towards 
more educational heterogamy in industrial so-
cieties, the third whether economic and political 
factors influence a country's heterogamy in the 
same way as they supposedly influence its 
mobility, and the fourth whether more mobility 
goes hand in hand with more heterogamy. 
One set of answers to these questions was 
dubbed the classical argument. Prime pro-
pounders are Lipset and Zetterberg (1959). This 
argument consists of affirmative answers. 
Another one was called the rival argument. It 
applies Bourdieu's (1972, 1974) notion of 
compensatory interdependencies between strat-
egies of reproduction, and provides negative 
answers to this article's questions. 
The first findings of this article were that 
industrial countries differ in rates and in relative 
chances of educational heterogamy. These find-
ings tell against the classical argument, and 
provide some support for the rival one. The 
second results indicated a slight trend towards 
higher rates and more equal relative chances of 
educational outmarriage. Those findings con-
tradict the rival argument and are in favour of 
the classical argument. 
According to the third findings of this article, 
some effects of political and economic factors on 
relative chances of educational heterogamy and 
marriage market opportunity structures occur. 
These effects are not fully in accord with the 
classical argument, nor do they always 
corroborate the rival argument. All factors 
taken together provide only a very partial 
explanation of the differences between this 
article's heterogamy tables. A rough comparison 
suggested that similar factors explain more of 
father-to-son mobility. 
This article's fourth result was that if an 
industrial country's relative chances of mobility 
are more equal, its relative chances of out-
marriage are so too. It confirms the final part of 
the classical argument and contradicts the rival 
one. This in turn shows the initial evidence of 
support for the rival argument to be spurious. 
One of this article's findings was that if an 
industrial nation's schools select and track 
pupils according to ability after the age of 12, 
relative chances of educational heterogamy in 
that country are more equal. Although school 
selection is a new exogenous variable in com-
parative openness research, this finding is 
encouraging for future studies. Another promis-
ing finding is that later selection seems to make 
for more equal relative mobility chances. On the 
basis of the data employed in this article, a 
correlation between school selection before the 
age of 12 (no, yes) and mobility odds ratios may 
be computed. This correlation has a value of 
0·35 (for the original data, 0·39 for the later 
data). This correlation is as expected according 
to this paper's classical argument. 
As regards the rival argument, the findings 
have not been wholly negative. The result that 
state socialism does not make for more edu-
cational heterogamy might indicate that 
compensatory interdependencies do not occur 
when changes are incremental, but that they do 
when changes are fundamental. This interpret-
ation is upheld by this arttcle's finding on edu-
cational laws, an incremental change that makes 
for more heterogamy. 
Reviewing all four sets of findings of this 
article, it might be said that although Lipset and 
Zetterberg were wrong in holding that mobility 
and marriage patterns were pretty much the 
same in industrial societies, their notion that 
openness is a pervasive and general societal 
characteristic has been upheld. Their argument 
fared better than the rival argument that out-
marriage and mobility are compensatory strat-
egies of reproduction and different in kind. Yet, 
given the result that there is less relative edu-
cational heterogamy than relative father-to-son 
occupational mobility, the classical argument 
must be augmented. That finding is reminiscent 
of Bogardus' scale for subjective distance 
between nationalities and Guttman scales in 
general. It suggests the notion of a hierarchy of 
indicators for societal openness, with inter-
\ ) 
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generational mobility being the 'easy' item, and 
educational heterogamy the more difficult one. 
The finding that political and economic factors 
are better in explaining father-to-son mobility 
than in explaining educational heterogamy 
points into the same direction. Closer ties seem 
less amenable to outside influences. 
NOTES 
1. The relevance attached to outmarriage carries the 
weight of classical sociology. Cf. de Tocqueville ([1835], 
1967: 160) and Weber ([1921], 1972: 179, 537). 
2. This paper does not concur with the argument that 
homogamy caused by residential segregation does not 
indicate societal openness. It amounts to rendering one 
indicator for openness invalid by postulating another 
(cf. Coleman, 1977). 
3. The well-known distinction between class as an attribute 
and class as a relation ( cf. Ingham, 1970) is here trans-
formed into the distinction between mobility as the 
movement of one unit and mobility as the formation of a 
relation between two units (cf. Bourdieu, 1984). 
4. [ MFT] means that the three-way marginals of the three-
way table (MF1) are fitted; [MT][FT][MF] meaning that 
the two-way marginals (MT], [FT], and [MF] of the 
three-way table (MF1) are fitted. This always implies 
that lower order marginals are fitted as well: in the case 
of [MFT] the two-way marginals [MT], (FT] and [MF], 
and the one-way rnarginals [M], [F], and [T]. 
5. Although this is not in line with the strict use of 
Goodman's hierarchical notation, we do not think that 
this will cause any problems. In other words 
[MT][FT][SymT] denotes the Conditional (Hetero-
geneous) Quasi-Symmetry Model: the model of Quasi-
Symmetry holds in every table. The Model 
[MT][FT][Sym] assumes Conditional Homogeneous 
Quasi-Symmetry, i.e. the symmetry parameters are the 
same for all tables. 
6. Note that this result depends upon the decision to scale 
every educational heterogamy table to a size of 1,000. 
7. The Fixed-Distance Model puts the following restric-
tions on the biik parameters: b;jk=bk* I i-j I (i=1, .. ,4; 
j=1, .. ,4). Sobel, Hout, and Duncan (1985) argued that 
models for cell associations should be symmetric. The 
Fixed-Distance Model belongs to this class. The fit of 
this model was decidedly better than that of the model 
of uniform association. Note that a Step Model is more 
parsimonious than a Sym Model. Instead of ten para-
meters only one parameter is used to describe the 
(symmetric) association in a four-by-four table. 
8. In a multiplicative specification: the more Step goes 
away from zero towards unity, the more open is a 
marriage pattern. 
9. Note that the variable T has only two values in this 
analysis: the former and the latter table of one country. 
10. We are talking about 41 tables again. 
11. A is coded no, yes. 
12. auk and aljk· 
13. a2jk=a2k*(i-j) (i,j=1, .. ,4). 
14. Alternatively this could be designated by 
[HT][DT][SymT]. 
15. What is more, Belgium's mobility table, although used 
in two benchmark studies, contains an error. The orig-
inal source (Delruelle, 1970) makes clear that for work-
ing males living in their parents' house, their own 
occupation is not used, but that of the head of the 
household in which respondent is living. That is, for 
these persons father's occupation has been cross-
classified with father's occupation, making for lower 
rates of mobility and more unequal rela:tive mobility 
chances in a table for the whole Belgian population. 
16. The more an odds ratio approaches unity, the more 
equal are relative mobility chances; the more equal to 
unity a Step parameter, the more equal are relative 
heterogamy chances. 
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APPENDIX ON DATA AND SOURCES 
Australia 1966: Data are from the Australian 1966 popul-
ation census. The original table had a four-by-four form. 
The four categories were: (a) primary or some high school: 
(b) intermediate certificate: (c) matriculation certificate: (d) 
tertiary certificate. Source: Broom and Jones (1976: 20). 
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Australia 1981: Data are tabulated from the I per cent 
public use sample of the 1981 Census of Population and 
Housing, Households sample file. The file contained two 
educational variables: age left school and qualifications 
obtained. On their base, one variable with the following four 
categories was constructed: (a) left school at 14 years or 
younger and none of the qualifications mentioned under (d); 
(b) left school at 15 years and none of the qualifications 
mentioned under (d); (c) left school at 16 or later and none 
of the qualifications mentioned under (d); (d) higher degree 
merged with graduate diploma, bachelor degree, and 
diploma level. The tape was obtained from the Social 
Sciences Data Archives, The Australian National 
University, Canberra. Jones (1987) is also based on this 
tape. 
Austria 1971: Data are from the Austrian 1971 population 
census. The original table had a four-by-four form. The four 
categories were: (a) Pflichtschule (einschliesslich 
Lehrausbildung); (b) mittlere Schule; (c) hohere Schule; (d) 
Hochschule und verwandte Lehranstalte. Source: Find! 
(1978: 861). We are grateful w Herrn I. Reichardt, 
Librarian of the Institut fiir hohere Studien in Vienna for 
making this study available. 
Austria 1981: Data are from the Austrian 1981 population 
census. The original table had a five-by-five form. The five 
categories were: (a) allgemein bildende Pflichtschule; (b) 
Lehre; (c) Fachschule; (d) hohere Schule; (e) Hochschule 
und verwandte Lehranstalt. For this article categories (a) 
and (b) were collapsed. This classification is identical to that 
for Austria in 1971. We are grateful to Prof. Dr. Max Haller, 
Karl-Franzens-Universitat Graz for pointing out the where-
abouts of this table. Source: Osterreichisches Statistisches 
Zentralamt (1986: 81). 
Belgium, Flanders 1976: Data are from the Third National 
Survey on Family Formation conducted in 1976. The sample 
consists of women between 20 and 44 years of age. The table 
originally had a five-by-five form: primary schooling, lower 
secondary, higher secondary, non-university higher edu-
cation and university. The last two categories were merged. 
The table was taken from the tape of this survey. We are 
grateful to Prof. R. L. Cliquet, Centrum voor Bevolkings-
en Gezinsstudieen, Brussels, for making this table available. 
Information on the survey in contained in Cliquet (1983: 14). 
Belgium, Flanders 1983: Data are from the Fourth 
National Survey on Family Formation conducted in 1983. 
Otherwise as Belgium, Flanders 1976. Information on the 
survey: Debusschere (1985). 
Canada 1971: Data are from the 1971 Canadian Popu-
lation Census. The original table had a six-by-six form. The 
four categories of this article were obtained as follows: (a) 
less than grade 5 merged with grades 5 to 8; (b) grades 9 to 
11 merged with grades 12 and 13; (c) some university; (d) 
university degree. Source: Statistics Canada (1974: 62). We 
are grateful to Prof. Richard A. Wanner, University of 
Calgary, for pointing out the existence of this table and the 
1981 table and for information on the Canadian educational 
svstem. 
·Canada 1981: Data are from the· 1981 Canadian popu-
lation census. The original table had a seven-by-seven form. 
The four categories of this article were obtained as follows: 
(a) Jess than grade 9; (b) grades 9 to 13 merged with 
non-university without certificate or diploma and with non-
univiersity with certificate or diploma; (c) university without 
degree, certificate or diploma merged with univeristy with 
certificate or diploma; (d) university degree. This classifi-
cation is comparable to that in Canada 1971 Source: Stat-
istics Canada (1984: 9). 
Czechoslovakia 1980: Data are from the 1980 census and 
pertain to married couples including concensual unions. The 
original table had an eight-by-eight form. Couples with at 
least one spouse with unstated education were eliminated 
(30,299 cases). The final four categories were: (a) no school-
ing, not completed first level merged with first level com-
pleted; (b) vocational completed; (c) second level first stage 
special completed merged with second level second stage 
general completed and with second level second stage 
special completed; (d) third level completed. The table 
(Table 909 of the 1980 Census) was made available by B. 
Titerova, Director International Statistics Division, 
Federalni Statisicky Urad, Praha, who also supplied transla-
tions of table headings. We are very obliged for these 
services. 
Denmark 1972: Data are from the 1972 Scandinavian 
Welfare Survey. Sample consisted of males and females 
between 15 and 64 years. The original table had an eight-by-
eight form. Less than elementary education and elementary 
education were recorded as lowest level, elementary plllS 
and middle school as second lowest level; middle school plus 
and matriculation as second highest level and matriculation 
plus and university as highest level. The table was taken 
from a file made available by the Danish Data Archives in 
Odense. Information on the Scandinavian Welfare Survey is 
contained in Pontinen (1980) and Allardt (1981). 
England & Wales 1949: The table was published by Berent 
(1954: 331), and is taken from Glass' 1949 mobility survey. 
The following four educational levels were distinguished: 
elementary, secondary, further education and higher edu-
cation. The survey was a sample survey of males and females 
older than 18 years. 
England & Wales 1972: Data are from the 1972 Oxford 
Mobility Study. This is a sample among males between 20 
and 64 years. Data were taken from a file made available by 
the ESRC Data Archive, University of Essex. The file had 
several variables on education. An earlier recoding was 
improved by Dr. Anthony Heath, University of Oxford. 
People who had left school at the minimum leaving age were 
given the lowest level, those who stayed on but failed to get 
0-level or above were given second lowest, people who 
obtained 0-level or above but not a higher level qualification 
were given the second highest level, and those that obtained 
a degree or a higher level professional education were given 
the highest level. We are extremely grateful to Dr. Anthony 
Heath for checking an earlier recoding and suggesting 
alternatives. The table is not comparable to England & 
Wales 1949. Halsey, Heath and Ridge (1980) is based on this 
file. 
Federal Republic of Germany 1971: The table is from the 
1971 micro census. The table had a six-by-six form, in the 
following manner reduced to a four-by-four form: (a) 
Volksschule ohne Lehre; (b) Volksschule mit gewerbliche 
Lehre merged with Volksschule mit kaufrnannischer Lehre; 
(c) mittlere Abschlusse; (d) Abitur, Fachhochschule merged 
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with Hochschulabschluss. The table was made available by 
Prof. Dr. R. Ziegler, Institut fiir Soziologie der Ludwig-
Maximilians-Universitat Miichen. An analysis of this table is 
contained in Ziegler (1985). 
Federal Republic of Germany 1982: The table is from the 
merged files of the ZUMA Allbus 1980-1984 sample 
surveys. This table is comparable to Federal Republic of 
Germany 1971. 
Finland 1972: Data are from the 1972 Scandinavian 
Welfare Survey. For other information see Denmark 1972, 
to which this table is comparable. 
Finland 1981: The table is from the 1981 Finnish Central 
Statistics Office Household Survey. The sample was at the 
individual level (persons 15 years or older), but was 
reweighed to obtain representativity at the household level. 
The original table had an eight-by-eight form, reduced to the 
following four-by-four form: (a) less than primary school 
merged with primary school (in the new school system: less 
than comprehensive merged with comprehensive for those 
having been part of the new school system); (b) middle 
school or primary plus lower vocational (or comprehensive 
plus lower vocational); (c) middle school plus higher voca-
tional, matriculation (comprehensive plus higher voca-
tional); (d) lowest level higher education merged with lower 
candidate examination and with higher level candidate 
examination. This classification is not wholly comparable to 
that for Finland 1972. Information on the 1981 Household 
Survey is contained in: Central Statistical Office of Finland 
1984. We are grateful to Dr. Seppo Pontinen, University of 
Helsinki, for procuring this table. 
France 1959: Data are taken from Girard (1964: 80). The 
sample consisted of first marriage couples, husbands under 
65 years and wives under 62 years. The original classification 
counted five categories, merged in the following way: (a) 
primaire; (b) primaire superieure merged with technique; 
(c) secondaire; (d) superieure. 
France 1969: Data are taken from a tape in the Belgian 
Archives for the Social Sciences, Louvain-la-Neuve (BASS 
number 7304), from a sample survey on attitudes towards 
the family in France conducted by the Section de 
Psychologic de l'Institut National d'Etudes Demo-
graphiques. No age limits were indicated. The survey 
apparently is a replication of Girard's 1959 survey. The 
educational classification and recode is that of France 1959. 
France 1981: The table originates in the Enquete Emploi 
of March 1981, Institut National de Ia Statistique et des 
Etudes Economiques, Paris. This is a sample survey with 
about 60,000 respondents, both males and females, no age 
limits are indicated. We estimate that the table for edu-
cational heterogamy is based on about 40,000 marriages. 
The educational classification was based on diplomas and 
consisted of seven categories. The category neant was given 
the lowest level, CEP, CAP and BEPC the second lowest, 
Baccalaureat second highest, and DUEL, DUES and 
Licence ou plus the highest level. The table was made 
available by Monsieur P. A. Audirac of the INSEE. We are 
very appreciative of his perseverance in locating this table in 
archives. The table is not comparable to France 1959 nor to 
France 1969. 
Hungary 1960: This table is from the official publication 
on the 1960 Census. We are grateful to Peter Robert, 
Institute for Social Sciences, Budapest, who pointed out the 
existence of this table and similar ones for 1970 and 1980, 
and who was so kind as to translate table headings. Re-
codings are as follows: (a) illiterate, no education, primary 
1-3 classes, primary 4-5 classes, and primary 6-7 classes; (b) 
primary 8 classes and unfinished secondary; (c) maturity, 
and unfinished university; (d) university diploma. Source 
Kozponti Statisztikai Hivital (1964: 53). 
Hungary 1970: This table is from the 1970 census and 
comparable to Hungary 1960. Source Kozponti Statisztikai 
Hivital (1982: 284-285). 
Hungary 1980: See Hungary 1960, to which this table is 
comparable. Source Kozponti Statisztikai Hivital (1982: 
286-289). 
Irish Republic 1973: This table was taken from a 1973 
sample survey among economically active males between the 
age of 18 and 64 years. The table originally had a six-by-six 
form. Ph.D. level and university degree level were merged 
into highest level, hnc and hnd level (one original category) 
were recoded as second highest level, 0-level and leaving 
certificate were merged in second lowest level, and below 
0-level was recoded as lowest level. We are grateful to Prof. 
John H. Jackson, Trinity College, Dublin, and Robert L. 
Miller, The Queen's University of Belfast, for making this 
table available. Hout and Jackson (1986) is based on data 
from the same file. 
Italy 1979: Data are from the Italian file of the Poverty 
Survey for the European Economic Community, deposited 
at the Steinmetz Archives in Amsterdam by A. J. M. 
Hagenaars and B. M. S. van Praag (number P0867). The 
lowest educational level was scuola elementare senza licenza 
merged with licenza di scuola elementare, second lowest level 
dipolma di scuola media inferiore, second highest diploma di 
scuola media superiore, and highest laurea. A report on this 
survey is Van Weeren and Van Praag (1984). 
Japan 1955: Data are taken from the 1955 Social Strati-
fication and Mobility Survey. Respondents in this sample 
survey were males between 20 and 64 years of age. The 
original table has a nine-by-nine form. Recoding was as 
follows: (a) no education merged with 6 years; (b) 8 years 
merged with 9 years; (c) 11 years merged with 12 years; (d) 
14 years merged with 16 and 17 years. We are grateful to 
Prof. Ken'ichi Tominaga and Yoshiaki E. Noro, University 
of Tokyo, for making this table available and for information 
on the Japanese educational system. A publication based on 
the data file of this table is Tominaga (1969). 
Japan 1965: Data are from the 1965 Social Stratification 
and Mobility Survey. The original table had an eight-by-
eight form. Six years of education were recoded as lowest 
level, 8 and 9 years as second lowest level, 11 and 12 years are 
second highest and 14, 16 and 17 years as highest. Otherwise 
as Japan 1955, to which the data are comparable. 
Netherlands 1959: The table is taken from a trial for the 
1960 population census. The table originally had a four-by-
four form, see Netherlands 1983. Source: De Hoog (1979). 
Netherlands 1971: The table is taken from the Dutch 1971 
population census. It is based on a 10 per cent sample from 
original files and refers to about 300,000 marriages. The 
table originally had a four-by-four form, see Netherlands 
1983. The table is comparable to Netherlands 1959. Source: 
De Hoog (1979). 
) 
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Netherlands 1983: Data are from the Life Situation Survey 
conducted by the Central Bureau of Statistics among males 
and females 18 years or older. Data were recoded from a 
very detailed educational classification into the following 
four classes: (a) only primary school; (b) completed lower 
vocational or middle general; (c) completed lower vo-
cational or middle general; (c) completed middle vocational 
higher general; (d) completed university or higher profes-
sional. These four categories are comparable to Netherlands 
1959 and Netherlands 1971. Tape made available ·by the 
Steinmetz Archives, Amsterdam. 
New Zealand 1981: Table was obtained for a substantial 
sum from the computer tapes of the New Zealand 1981 
Census. Lowest level of education was no secondary edu-
cation, second lowest level 3rd-5th form, second highest 6th 
form merged with 7th form, and highest university merged 
with teachers' college, polytechnical-technical institute-
community college and other tertiary. 
Northern Ireland 1973: See Irish Republic, to which this 
table is comparable. 
Norway 1957: This table has been made available by Mr. 
Bjll)rn Henrichsen and Mr. John-Erik Agotnes, of the 
Norwegian Social Science Data Services, Oslo, to whom our 
thanks. The table is from the Norwegian 1957 Election 
Study. We have no details on this study, that apparently 
samples adult males and females. The original table had a 
five-by-five form, collapsed as follows: (a) folkeskole; (b) 
realskole, middelskole merged with folkehll)gskole and with 
framhaldskole; (c) gymnas; (d) universitet, hll)gskole. 
Norway 1972: See Denmark 1972, to which this table is 
comparable. Table is not strictly comparable to Norway 
1957. 
Poland 1982: This table is from a sample survey of 
households. The survey was undertaken by Prof. Dr. Lydia 
Beskid, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, and the table 
was made available by Prof. Jules Peschar and Dr. Ronald 
Batenburg, University of Groningen, Netherlands. The 
original table had 13 educational categories, reduced to the 
following four: (a) no education, elementary incomplete, 
elementary complete, basic vocational incomplete; (b) basic 
vocational complete, secondary vocational incomplete, 
secondary general incomplete; (c) secondary vocational 
complete, secondary general complete, post secondary 
general incomplete, post secondary general complete, 
university incomplete; (d) university complete. 
Scotland 1973: Data are from a tape made available by the 
ESRC Data Archive, University of Essex, of the 1973 
Scottish Mobility Survey. For the design of the survey and 
the recodings of the educational variables, see England & 
Wales 1972, to which this table is comparable. 
Sweden 1972: See Denmark 1972, to which it is 
comparable. 
Sweden 1981: Data are from the 1981 Level of Living 
Survey. This survey samples Swedish population of 15-75 
years. We are grateful to Prof. Dr. Robert Erikson and Dr. 
Janne Jonsson, Swedish Institute for Social Research, 
Stockholm, for making this table available. This table is not 
strictly comparable to Sweden 1972. 
United States 1962: This table is from the file of the 1962 
Occupational Changes in Generation Survey. This study was 
part of the March 1962 Current Population Survey of the 
U.S. Bureau of the Census. Males between 20 and 64 years 
were sampled. The original table had an eight-by-eight form. 
Lowest level was formed by elementary 1-4, elementary 5-7 
and elementary 8, high school1-3 were second lowest level, 
high school 4 was second highest level and college 1-3, 
college 4 and college 5+ were highest level. The file was 
obtained from the Data and Program Library Services, 
University of Wisconsin, Madison. The main study based on 
this file is Blau and Duncan (1967). 
United States 1973: This table is from the file of the 1973 
Occupational Change in a Generation Survey. This study 
was part of the March 1973 Current Population Survey of the 
U.S. Bureau of the Census. Males between 20 and 64 years 
were sampled. For recodings, see United States 1962, to 
which the 1973 table is comparable. Main study: Featherman 
and Hauser (1978). 
United States 1983: This table is from the 1982-1985 
General Social Survey, a sample of adult males and females. 
Only males aged between 20 and 64 were selected. The tape 
of this file was obtained from the Inter-University 
Consortium for Political and Social Research, Ann Arbor, 
Michigan. For recodings, see United States 1962, to which 
this 1983 table is comparable. 
Yugoslavia 1971: This table is from the tape of a compara-
tive survey reported in Verba, Nie and Kim (1978). The tape 
was obtained from the Inter-University Consortium for 
Political and Social Research, Ann Arbor, Michigan. The 
sample pertains to adult males and females in the provinces 
Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia, and Slovenia. Recodings were 
as follows: (a) no education, merged with 4 years or less 
primary school and 4-8 years primary school; (b) occu-
pational school; (c) high school, teachers' college or 
technical school; (d) college. 
